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Abstract—The Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) is a measure
of both confusion and diffusion, which are key properties of
a cryptographic hash function. This work provides a working
definition of the SAC, describes an experimental methodology
that can be used to statistically evaluate whether a cryptographic
hash meets the SAC, and uses this to investigate the degree to
which compression function of the SHA-1 hash meets the SAC.
The results (P < 0.01) are heartening: SHA-1 closely tracks
the SAC after the first 24 rounds, and demonstrates excellent
properties of confusion and diffusion throughout.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many computer scientists know little about the inner work-
ings of cryptographic hashes, though they may know some-
thing about their properties. One of these properties is the
“avalanche effect”, by analogy with the idea of a small stone
causing a large avalanche of changes. The “avalanche effect”
explains how a small change in the input data can result in a
large change in the output hash. However, many questions
around the effect are unanswered. For example, how large
is the effect? After how many “rounds” of a compression
function can it be seen? Do all inputs result in such an
effect? Little experimental work has been done to answer these
questions for any hash function, and this paper contributes
experimental results that help in this regard.
A boolean n-bit hash function H is the transform Zm2 →
Zn2 . A cryptographic hash function attempts to obscure the
relationship between the input and output of F , and the degree
to which this is accomplished is directly related to the (second-
)preimage resistance of the hash function. This implies that
two similar inputs should have very different outputs.
The Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) ([1], [2]) formalizes
this notion by measuring the amount of change introduced in
the output by a small change in the input. It builds on the
definition of completeness, which means that each bit of the
output depends on all the bits of the input, in a way that is
cryptographically relevant. Using the definition of H as above,
an output H(x) = y is obtained for an input x. The initial
bit of x is now flipped, giving H(x0) = y0. This process is
repeated for x1..n, resulting in y1..n. The SAC is met when
the Hamming distance between y and y0..n is, on average, n2 .
There are three contributions that this paper makes to the
existing body of research:
1) A definition of what the SAC is;
2) Experimental SAC results for a particular cryptographic
hash (SHA-1);
3) An exploration of intermediate results
Section 2 of this paper examines related work and argues
that the SAC as proposed by Webster & Tavares [1] has
been misunderstood in much of the contemporaneous critical
literature. Section 3 introduces salient points of a well-known
cryptographic hash (SHA-1) which is assumed to exhibit the
SAC, and describes an experimental design to test its SAC-
compliance. Section 4 presents experimental results, and some
discussion follows.
II. RELATED WORK
The original definition [1] of the SAC is:
Consider X and Xi, two n-bit, binary plaintext
vectors, such that X and Xi differ only in bit i,
1 < i < n. Let
Vi = Y ⊕ Yi
where Y = f(X) , Yi = f(Xi) and f is the
cryptographic transformation, under consideration.
If f is to meet the strict avalanche criterion, the
probability that each bit in Vi is equal to 1 should be
one half over the set of all possible plaintext vectors
X and Xi. This should be true for all values of i.
Forre´ [2] expresses this as:
Let x and xi denote two n-bit vectors, such that
x and xi differ only in bit i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Zn2
denotes the n-dimensional vector space over 0,1.
The function f(x) = z, z ∈ {0, 1} fulfills the SAC
if and only if
∑
x∈Zn2
f(x)⊕f(xi) = 2n−1, for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Similarly, Lloyd [3] understands the SAC as:
Let f : Zn2 7→ Zm2 be a cryptographic transfor-
mation. Then f satisfies the strict avalanche criterion
if and only if
∑
x∈Zn2
f(x)⊕f(x⊕ci) = (2n−1, ..., 2n−1) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
9.
00
61
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
 Se
p 2
01
6
where ⊕ denotes bitwise exclusive or and ci is
a vector of length n with a 1 in the ith position and
0 elsewhere.
Other works ([4], [5], [6], [7]) follow in the same vein.
However, these definitions calculate the sum over all possible
inputs as leading to the fulfillment of the SAC, which is
contrary to the original definition. The original definition
separates a baseline value from the avalanche vectors, and
states that the SAC holds true when “the probability that each
bit [in the avalanche vectors] is equal to 1 should be one half
over the set of all possible plaintext vectors” [1]. Therefore,
a better test of whether f : Zn2 7→ Z2 fulfills the SAC would
use a universal quantifier,
∀x ∈ Zn2 , P (f(x) = f(xi)) = 0.5
for all xi which differ from x in bit i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
A simple example clarifies the difference. Babbage [6] uses
Lloyd’s [3] definition of the SAC and defines a SAC-compliant
function:
Define f : Zn2 7→ Z2 by{
f(x1, ..., xn) = 0 if x1 = 0
f(x1, ..., xn) = x2 ⊕ ...⊕ xn if x1 = 1
The simplest function of this nature is f(x) = x0∧x1. Then,
taking g(x) = f(x)⊕f(x⊕01) and h(x) = f(x)⊕f(x⊕10),
x f(x) g(x) h(x) P (f(x) = f(xi))
00 0 0 0 1.0
01 0 0 1 0.5
10 0 1 0 0.5
11 1 1 1 1.0
Sum: 2 2
Note that the sum of each of the third and fourth columns is
2n−1, as predicted, and that this function fulfills the summed
definition of the SAC. However, the first and last rows do not
fulfill the original definition of the SAC at all: the probability
of change, given the baseline values 00 and 11, is 0.0 in
each case. It is therefore more reasonable to regard the
row probability as important. This understanding is also in
accordance with the original text that defined the term. Under
this definition, x0 ∧ x1 is not SAC-compliant.
It is worth noting that the original definition, as per Webster
& Tavares [1], is slightly ambiguous. They state that “the
probability that each bit in Vi is equal to 1 should be one
half over the set of all possible plaintext vectors X and Xi”;
however, they also state that “to satisfy the strict avalanche
criterion, every element must have a value close to one half ”
(emphasis mine). Under Lloyd’s interpretation, the SAC is
only satisfied when an element changes with a probability of
precisely 0.5. This is an unnecessarily binary criterion, as it
seems to be more useful (and more in line with the original
definition) to understand how far a particular sample diverges
from the SAC. Therefore, this paper regards the SAC as a
continuum but takes Lloyd’s formulation as the definition of
what it means to “meet” the SAC.
Preneel [4] suggests a generalisation of the SAC called the
propagation criterion (PC), defined as
Let f be a Boolean function of n variables. Then
f satisfies the propagation criterion of degree k,
PC(k), (1 ≤ k ≤ n), if fˆ(x) changes with a
probability of 1/2 whenever i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) bits of x
are complemented.
It can be seen that the SAC is equivalent to PC(1). The
same work defines an extended propagation criterion which
regards the SAC as a continuum. Much of the subsequent
work ([8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]) in this area has more
closely examined the relationship between PC and nonlinearity
characteristics. Many of these extend the PC in interesting
ways and examine ways of constructing functions which
satisfy PC(n), but experimental research that targets existing
algorithms is scarce.
Although there are proven theoretical ways to construct a
function which satisfies the SAC [7], there is no way (apart
from exhaustive testing) to verify that an existing function
satisfies the SAC. By contrast, useful cryptographic properties
such as non-degeneracy [14] or bentness [15] are verifiable
without having to resort to exhaustive testing. However, the
SAC metric is no worse in this regard than the correlation
immunity [16] and balance [17] metrics which also require
exhaustive testing.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The SHA-1 hash [18] is a well-known cryptographic hash
function which generates a 160-bit hash value. It is the
successor to the equally well-known MD5 cryptographic hash
function which generated a 128-bit hash value. SHA-1 was
designed by the National Security Agency of the United
States of America and published in 1995 as National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal Information
Processing Standard 180-1.
A. Hash details
The SHA-1 hash is constructed using the Merkle-Da˚mgard
paradigm ([19], [20]), which means that it consists of padding,
chunking, and compression stages. These stages are necessary
for the hash algorithm to be able to handle inputs which are
greater than 447 bits in length; however, they are unnecessary
to consider in an examination of the compression function
itself, since the strength of the Merkle-Da˚mgard paradigm is
predicated on the characteristics of the compression function.
This paper examines only the compression function itself, and
does not concern itself with padding, chunking, or Davies-
Meyer strengthening [21].
The SHA-1 compression function makes use of addition,
rotation, and logical functions (AND, OR, NOT, XOR), ap-
plied over the course of 80 rounds, to convert the 16 input
words into a 5-word (160-bit) output. Each round affects the
calculation of subsequent rounds, and the hashing process can
therefore not be parallelized to any significant degree. A full
description of the inner workings of SHA-1 is provided in
FIPS 180-1 [18]. For the purposes of this work, it is sufficient
to understand that each round generates a value that is used
in subsequent rounds, and that there are 80 rounds in total.
B. Statistical approach
It is computationally infeasible to exhaustively test the
degree to which SHA-1 meets the SAC since the input space
(2672) is too large. However, it is possible to use a sampling
approach instead, where representative samples are drawn
from a population and inferences are made based on an
analysis of those samples. This approach relies on each input
being statistically independent of other inputs. Generating such
input can be an extraordinarily difficult task [22]; however,
random.org1 provides data which meets this requirement [23],
[24]. A source which may be more random, but which has
undergone far less scrutiny, is HotBits2. Data for these exper-
iments has therefore been obtained from random.org.
The inputs which make up the population should represent
real-world usage, and the form of the input is therefore of
concern. The inputs to the SHA-1 compression function are
twofold: 16 32-bit words of input data and an initialization
vector of 5 32-bit words, for a total of 21 32-bit words (or
672 bytes). The initial initialization vector is defined by the
FIPS 180-1 specification, and the input data is padded and
terminated such that the last two words processed by the
algorithm encode the length of the input data. Subsequent
initialization vectors are generated from the output of the pre-
vious application of the compression function. For any input
which is larger than 1024 bytes, there is therefore at least one
iteration of the compression function for which all 672 bytes
are effectively ”random” — if it is assumed that a previous
iteration of the compression function can possibly result in
the applicable initialization vector. To make this assumption,
is sufficient to assert that there are no values which cannot
be generated as intermediate intitialization vectors (given a
pool of ≤ 264 different bitstreams). Therefore, we can take
independent 672-byte inputs as our population of concern.
The hypothesis to be tested is that SHA-1 meets the SAC.
The desired margin of error is 1%, at a 99% confidence level.
The required sample size is therefore determined by
n =
(
erf−1(0.99)
0.01
√
2
)2
= 16587
where erf−1 is the inverse error function
Given the 2672 input space, this seems to be a very small
number; however, “it is the absolute size of the sample
which determines accuracy, not the size relative to the popula-
tion” [25]. Data collected during the experiment also indicates
1https://www.random.org
2https://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/
the degree to which SHA-1 does not meet the SAC, and the
round at which the SAC comes into effect.
Each of the 16587 inputs is passed through a custom
implementation of the SHA-1 compression function. This im-
plementation has not been validated by NIST’s Cryptographic
Algorithm Validation Program3, but nevertheless passes all of
the byte-oriented test vectors provided by NIST; in addition,
source code for the compression function is available on re-
quest. When presented with a 672-byte input, the compression
function outputs a list of 80 vectors, one for each round of
the compression function. Baseline and avalanche vectors are
generated for each input, and per-round compliance with the
SAC is determined by these.
The primary question that this work seeks to answer is: to
what degree do each of the output bits meet the SAC? To
determine this, the per-input SAC value for each bit must be
calculated, as described above. The geometric mean of the
SAC values is representative of the central tendency. From
the data that is generated to answer the primary question, two
other questions may be fruitfully answered:
• What is the distribution of SAC values per input? The
geometric mean provides a way to understand the degree
to which an output bit meets the SAC, on average over a
range of inputs. The distribution of SAC values quantifies
how likely any particular input is to meet the SAC.
• How quickly do the bits of the SHA-1 hash meet (or
not meet) the SAC?
For repeatability, it is disclosed that the data used to create
inputs is the first 16587 × 672 = 11, 146, 464 bits generated
by random.org from the 2nd to the 12th of January 2015. This
data is available from https://www.random.org/files/.
IV. RESULTS
As shown by Figure 1, the SHA-1 hash diverges from the
SAC by remarkably small amounts. The initial divergence is
due entirely to the fact that the very last bits of a 672-bit input
are found in rounds 15 and 16 and, when modified, have an
exaggerated effect on subsequent rounds. This effect is largely
due to the fact that the changes have not yet had time to diffuse
through the rounds. Data which is most representative of the
final hash output can therefore be seen in rounds ≥ 24.
If sufficient time is provided for diffusion, a different picture
emerges. Figure 2 shows the absolute divergence from round
24 onwards. Although the heatmap looks noisier, the most
important thing to note is that the maximum divergence from
the “ideal” SAC value of 0.5 is only 0.0009, which is within
the margin of error for this sample size.
A 5-figure statistical summary (minimum, lower quantile,
median, upper quantile, and maximum) of deviation from the
SAC is plotted as Figure 3. In this graph, (round, bit) tuples
have been converted to single value bits using the function
bit(r, i) = (r−1)·32+(i−1). This was done to better illustrate
noteworthy points, and because there is no round-specific
pattern in the data. The median value is 0.0 throughout, and the
3http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/#03
Figure 1. Divergence from SAC, round 17..80
Figure 2. Divergence from SAC, rounds 24..80
lower and upper quartiles demonstrate remarkable consistency
across the rounds despite minima and maxima which fluctuate
significantly. It is interesting to note that rounds 24..44 show
the same pattern as rounds 60..80, which are the final rounds of
the hash. The distribution of values appears to remain constant
from round 24 all the way up to round 80.
The distribution of SAC values for rounds ≥ 24 is shown
in Figure 4, and there are few surprises here. It has a
median, mean, and mode of 0.5, and appears to be a normal
distribution. To verify whether the distribution is, in fact,
normal, a quantile-quantile plot was generated. A quantile-
quantile plot overlays points from a data-set on top of the
theoretically-predicted distribution; if the actual points lie
along the theoretically-predicted line, then the data fits the
specified distribution.
Three possible distributions were plotted (see Figure 5):
• Normal (σ = 0.019285397, µ = 0.5), using the standard
deviation and mean of the data where round ≥ 24.
• Log-normal (σ = 0.059899039, µ = 0.49855239),
estimated from the data.
Figure 3. Summary statistics
• Weibull (k = 9.6116811, λ = 0.52480750), estimated
from the data.
None of the distributions match the data exactly; in fact,
the normal distribution is the worst fit, with log-normal and
Weibull distributions being much closer fits. At present, the
distribution that the data conforms to is unknown.
Figure 4. Distribution of SAC values
Figure 5. Quantile-quantile plot showing goodness of fit
Lastly, the averaged per-round distribution of SAC values is
shown as Figure 6, which may be regarded as a 3D histogram
where zero-buckets have been discarded. This graph attempts
to show trends and changes in SAC values through rounds. The
“spikiness” of the center is immediately noticeable, despite the
SAC values being averaged. This reflects the fact that SAC
values tend strongly towards 0.5. The right side of the graph
is shorter than the left, and also higher; since zero-buckets
have been discarded, this would indicate that SAC values tend
to be distributed into more buckets as they tend towards zero,
and conversely concentrated into fewer buckets as they tend
towards 1. This tendency is present throughout the rounds.
The z-axis curve in the middle of the bits, which appears to
be too pronounced to be an artifact of averaging, would seem
to indicate that there are more non-zero buckets that are being
filled as the bit-value increases. However, such an increase
should result in a decrease of SAC values at other points —
and a corresponding dip at those points on the x-axis. There is
no such dip, and other visualisations do not indicate such an
increase. In the absence of any other explanation, it is believed
that it is an artifact of the visualisation.
Figure 6. Distribution of SAC values, per-round
V. DISCUSSION
The questions posed may now be answered. As the experi-
mental results show, each of the output bits meets the SAC by
round 24, and it therefore takes only 8 rounds from the end
of the input data for the SAC values to settle into a “stable”
state. This stable state persists through all of the remaining
rounds.
The distribution of SAC values does not fit any of the
tested distributions exactly. However, the distribution displays
a regularity that makes it quite possible that a less well-
known distribution will fit. Further analysis of this could be
worthwhile, since the distribution of SAC values may provide
a different way to understand the behaviour of the hash.
One of the characteristics of a cryptographic hash is
(second-)preimage resistance: the computational infeasibility
of finding an input that results in a particular output. The
SAC results obtained from these experiments highlight the
difficulty of obtaining a specific preimage since, from round 24
onwards, the SAC is either met or very closely approximated.
This makes it extraordinarily difficult to determine which input
bit could contribute to a particular output change, since the
answer is likely to be “any of them”!
The methodology that has been described above is not
specific to the SHA-1 hash, and may be applied to any hash
function. It would be interesting to see it applied to other
hash functions with a view to comparing their SAC values and
distributions to the results above. Similarities and differences,
and the possible reasons for them, would make for interesting
research. For example, SHA-1’s spiritual predecessor, MD5,
has also proven to be resistant to preimage attacks; could the
reason be that it shares a similarly rapid achievement of close-
to-SAC bits, followed by a similarly “stable” maintenance of
the SAC through all of its rounds?
On an implementation note, it may be worthwhile to use
a cloud computing platform (such as Google’s BigTable)
for future experiments of this nature. The experiments have
generated tens of gigabytes of data which take some time to
query on a single machine. The scalable infrastructure of the
cloud may allow queries, and hence experiments, to proceed
more quickly.
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